Analysis and awareness of the types of power that IS professionals exercise over users can improve the productivify of both parties.
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Power relations between users and information systems professionals are a central concern for both practitioners and researchers in information systems (IS). Practitioners wish to see their solutions implemented and used successfully; practical guidelines for system developers and implementors generally recognize the differing power bases of technological experts and users and offer advice on the conduct of implementation politics [ZO, 441. Some IS researchers, on the other hand, emphasize the role of professionals' power in achieving technological benefits and effecting technological change [27] ; others stress that meaningful participation in system design requires the users to possess a certain level of power in their dealings with professionals [2, 311. We address one-half of the professional/user power relation: the power of IS professionals over systems users. We believe that, if both professionals and users can increase their awareness of the different types of power exercise, the quality of systems developed and the outcomes of their use will be significantly enhanced.
THE SOURCES OF IS PROFESSIONAL POWER
The notion that the developers of information technology have power over users seems intuitively correct. Information technology is a resource many people value, and it seems likely that the gatekeepers of information technology would be able, if they choose, to extract rewards from those individuals or groups who depend on it [37] ; this reasoning reflects a theory of power known as "resource dependence" [38] . 01987 ACM OOOl-0782/87/0600-0498 750 Communications of the ACM Another theory explains the power of such organizational departments as IS in terms of "strategic contingencies," in which departmental power results from a combination of three attributes: the ability to cope with environmental or task uncertainty faced by other departments or the organization as a whole, indispensability in this coping, and influence on the subunit's or organization's work flow [17] .
Given the high involvement of IS departments in an organization's work flow and dependence on computing operations, the theory of strategic contingencies suggests that IS departments are likely to be powerful players in organizational politics. Although Lucas [27] and Saunders and Scamell [40, 411 tested this theory and found that user departments do not generally perceive IS departments as powerful, it would be unfortunate if these findings discouraged further research on the power of IS professionals. The potential consequences of IS professional power for users are simply too significant to remain unexplored. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to conclude from these findings that IS professionals do not exert power over users. In saying this, we are drawing a deliberate distinction between having power and using it.
The strategic contingencies theory, like the resource dependence theory, explains power in terms of its sources; that is, the factors that enable actors to acquire it and possess it [38, chap. 21. However, sources of power are only loosely related to the use of power:
[S]ome social actors, who might be potentially powerful, may not recognize the [sources of power] or the fact that ]une 1987 Volume 30 Number 6 they possess them.. . . Even if power positions are recognized, organizational actors may choose not to employ their power. [38, pp. 48-491. In addition, empirical investigations of the strategic contingencies theory have measured users' perceptions of IS department power. It is possible, however, for IS professionals to exercise power over users without users perceiving it. In fact, the very lack of users' awareness of the use of power may indicate an especially effective (i.e., powerful) exercise of it.
THE EXERCISE OF IS PROFESSIONAL POWER
Building on the work of the European sociologists Lukes [28] and Christensen and Daugard [7] , and on prior work by Bjorn-Andersen [2] , our conceptualization of the power of IS professionals does not depend on either sources of power or awareness of power use. Instead, we emphasize the exercise of power and define this in terms of behavioral outcomes, rather than intentions or the perceived legitimacy of behaviors involving power use. Thus, from our perspective, to say that IS professionals have exercised power over users means that the users behaved differently from the way they would have if not for the professionals. In addition, we argue that power over users can be exercised both individually and collectively by IS professionals. "IS professionals" include all those individuals and groups, either inside or outside the users' firm, who "consult" with users; that is, assess their needs, propose solutions, and/or advocate a course of action. This broad category includes systems analysts, designers, managers, and vendor marketing and product development personnel. Although our definition of power exercise is not unprecedented [16, 281, it is controversial. Many power theorists [9, 381 will only concede an exercise of power when the two parties overtly disagree about a specific decision and where it is possible to observe the "powerful" actor's behavioral attempts to influence decision outcomes [28] . Furthermore, many power theorists will only define the exercise of power as a situation in which the "powerless" party does not accept the behavior of the powerful actor or views it as illegitimate ([34] and Saunders, personal communication, June 1986 ). These more restrictive definitions assume that the power exercise is an intended action by individuals. Context. IS power exercise can take place in the context of a specific IS development project, such as the design of a marketing information system. Such activities as interviewing users to determine their requirements and writing up the statement of needs offer opportunities for systems developers to change the behavior and desires of users. However, there are also many opportunities to exercise power in the management policy environment around specific systems development projects. Examples include computer policy decisions such as the type of hardware the organization will buy, the nature of the applications portfolio, and policies for charging back computing services, as well as vendors' marketing and product development activities.
Target. IS power exercise can be directed at factual issues and tangible resources, such as the amount of money to be spent on hardware and the features and functions of an operational system. On the other hand, the power exercise can focus on people's values and attitudes, including the accepted objectives for a particular system, the evaluation of a project's success, the expected benefits from a proposed system [38, chap. 61, social definitions of "good" technology, and workplace ideologies [24] . (See Bjern-Andersen and Kjaergaard [3] for elaboration on values as the target power exercise.)
The two dimensions of context and target demarcate four types of power exercise. Given the controversy surrounding our definition of power exercise, we will attempt to justify each type as an exercise of power in addition to describing it and presenting the relevant research.
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Communications of the ACMThe Technical Exercise of Power IS professionals exercise technical power over users when they select system design features to which users explicitly object, at least initially.' Users might object to the cost of a proposed system or about a matter of management philosophy. A technical exercise of power occurs, for example, when clerical users want a new system to enrich their jobs, but IS professionals select system features that fractionalize work. Some people may argue that what we call the technical exercise of power represents rational persuasion through technical expertise rather than power use. Such an argument presumes that users are motivated to accept the technical expertise of systems developers and that technical experts, given expert knowledge, attempt to persuade clients that their recommendations make sense. However, Freidson's thoughtful analysis of the medical profession [15] provides a counter to this argument. He asserts that patients are not always inclined to accept the technical advice of physicians. Physicians, in turn, only rarely attempt rational persuasion with clients.
Freidson believes his arguments can be applied to all consulting professionals, a category that includes our definition of IS professionals. A recent study by Salaway [39] offers some evidence that systems analysts, like physicians, do not attempt to persuade their clients rationally. In their interactions with users, analysts frequently advocate a particular course of action without providing users with the data by which they can make their own evaluations.
The existing literature does not allow us to conclude that IS professionals are the only ones who influence systems design decisions, or that they are even the most powerful of those who do [5, 111. We do not know, for example, how often users disagree overtly or covertly with IS professionals about design questions or what percentage of contested design decisions IS professionals "win." However, a sizable body of research pertains to conflicts between users and professionals and leads to a conclusion that IS professionals sometimes use the technical type of power exercise over users. Case and anecdotal evidence attests to the pervasiveness of user resistance to certain types of information technology [29-311. In addition, the "models of man" literature (reviewed by Dagwell and Weber [8] ) suggests that systems analysts in several national cultures base their design decisions on a view of users that differs ' Even if users do not explicitly object to a system design, a power exercise may be said to have occurred if it can he demonstrated that users would have objected had they been aware of the implications of IS professionals' selection of system features (see [28] ).
sharply from the views users hold of themselves. Thus it seems that the conditions of conflicting perspectives, which favor this exercise of power, are widespread (see also [lo] and [42] ). The models of man literature further suggests that much of this power exercise takes place outside the awareness of systems analysts, whose espoused theories are considerably different from their theories-in-use.
The Structural Exercise of Power The structural exercise of power takes place outside the context of any particular systems development project and cannot be as easily traced as technical power exercise to the behaviors of particu.lar individuals. Here, IS professionals exercise power over user behavior by creating organizational structures and routine operating procedures that give them formal authority over users or foster user dependence on them for important resources.
In many organizations, for example, users are prohibited from purchasing computing equipment in excess of a certain dollar value without the explicit approval of the IS department. This may strongly influence users' technology adoption decisions. In other firms, IS departments develop planning approaches that may constrain the users' abilities to design their own applications portfolios. User departments may also be required by corporate policy to rely on the services of systems analysis personnel located in a central IS department, distanced from the users' experience and needs. In these examples, it is primarily the development of policies and practices that constitutes the exercise of power, not necessarily their application to any particular case. Structural constraints on users can obviate the need for more direct forms of power use, such as the technical type of power exercise.
Furthermore, Freidson [l5] argues that physicians do not have to try to persuade their clients rationally because many years ago they sought and obtained legal control over a resource that clients may value more than medical advice: access to prescription drugs. It is doubtful whether physicians would exert as much influence over patients' behavior today if not for this structural condition. Similarly, users may not want to follow the design suggestions of the IS department, but they get them anyway, "bundled with" the systems analysis personnel, the system acquisition procedures, and the system planning processes they have to use.
Again, the literature does not permit conclusions about the relative balance of power between IS professionals and users or about the frequency and severity of the structural type of power exercise. However, frequent references are made to the need for "coordination" and "integration" where information technology is concerned [Zl] . (A number of studies of IS outcomes that are consistent with the structural exercise of power as presented above include [6] , [lo] , [14] , [22] , [23] , [25] , [31, chap. 71, and [36] .)
The Conceptual Exercise of Power The technical and structural types of power exercise "work" on such issues of fact as the design features of systems and the distribution of access to computing equipment and services. The conceptual and symbolic types of power exercise work on people's values about and attitudes toward these issues and, indeed, toward the exercise of power itself.
A might exercise power over B bJi getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get others to have the desires you want them to have-that is to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? [28, p. 231 Systems analysts exert power conceptually over users by selecting the objectives a particular information system will serve. Conceptual here refers to the design concept of an IS; that is, the package of objectives for the system that are reflected in its physical design features.
The conceptual exercise of power is closely linked with the methods used to analyze organizational situations prior to developing system design features. The traditional systems analysis and design methodologies (SADT, Jourdan, Jackson, etc.] largely follow the principles of scientific management-functional analysis, hierarchical decomposition, task fractionalization, and division of labor-and consequently tend to produce highly structured jobs and organizational procedures.
In addition, by the questions they stimulate designers to ask (or not to ask), system design and analysis methods may prevent users from expressing their preferences for and against certain system design features and may even prevent users from forming such preferences. Some commonly used methods of systems analysis simply do not pose questions about the relationship between the system and users' job satisfaction or other social values ' [18; 26; 31, chap. 5; XI] .
Few studies have directly addressed the conceptual type of power exercise and its relationship to the methodologies of systems analysis and design, ' In many cases the choice of analysis method is prescribed by corporate IS policy rather than being negotiated by individual analysts and users--another instance of the structural exercise of power.
but Franz and Robey [14] and Markus [31, chap. 71 provide some evidence of its occurrence.
The Symbolic Exercise of Power IS professionals exert power symbolically by shaping users' desires and values outside the context of an individual systems development effort. The most important instance of this type of power exercise OCcurs when users employ the products of systems development processes. Many researchers have observed that applications of information technology can embody ideas and theories about the desired nature and organization of work [ll, 31,47,48] . Use of IS with embedded ideals can influence users' attitudes and beliefs about job and work design.
An example of this process can be seen in users' reactions to microcomputer technology. Evidence suggests that information technology contributes more to organizational effectiveness by improving group and organizational productivity than by improving personal broductivity [43] . Yet virtually every newspaper, magazine, and television advertisement for microcomputers emphasizes the benefits of this technology for personal productivity. By and large, users have preferred microcomputers, lured by the promise of increased control over their own work, to the integrated solutions based on shared mainframe and minicomputer technology proposed by internal IS professionals.
Users' comments often reveal the subtle force of symbolic power exercise: "How can I be against the computer system? It's progress, isn't it?" [5] . Hoos [18] highlights a similar dynamic in her query: "Technology is the answer, but what is the question?"
Of all the types of power exercise, the symbolic is least examined and researched, perhaps because it largely occurs outside the awareness of both IS professionals and users. Many people may be reluctant even to consider this a type of power exercise because it is so difficult to trace to the behaviors of individuals. In the microcomputer example cited above, for instance, the culprit would appear to be the dominant vendors of microcomputer technology. Discussions of this actor's use of power are clouded by its diffuse persona and the assumption that market transactions involve "free" choice.
Despite the limited empirical research on this type of power exercise, case support for its existence can be found. For example, Jangaard [19] described how a small Norwegian company nearly went broke adopting a standard production management software package that a vendor had developed for large, mass-production manufacturers. Other accounts of the symbolic exercise of power can be found in Markus [31, chap. 61, Markus and Pfeffer [32] , and Turkle [@I.
AWARENESS OF POWER EXERCISE
Again, we must emphasize that our framework does not assume that either users or IS professionals are aware of the four types of power exercise either before, during, or after the acts themselves. Thus, professionals may not believe they are deliberately intending to alter users' behavior in ways users could define as contrary to their interests. Rather, professionals may describe their behavior in terms of carrying out the mandate of top management, and users may believe that they have been swayed by technical expertise as opposed to being the victims of a political maneuver. This lack of awareness occurs because people seem to evaluate "having power" differently from "using power." In Western culture generally, and in the IS literature particularly, it has become increasingly legitimate to be identified as having the sources of power, such as expert knowledge, personal credibility, or disposable resources. Much of the implementation literature, for example, asserts that implementors must be powerful in order to ensure the success of IS. However contradictory it may seem, using power is not viewed in the same positive light; many cultural taboos still surround the use of power [28] .
In our framework, exercises of power can be identified even in situations where both users and professionals are unaware that power has been exercised and believe the action to have been legitimate. As we have stated before, it is only the changes in user behavior or organizational outcomes (relative to what would have occurred if the professionals had not been involved) that define the exercise of power.
This does not mean, however, that the awareness of power exercise or attributions of legitimacy to the use of power are irrelevant. Awareness and the perceived legitimacy of power exercise will affect users' responses to professionals and their acceptance of the solutions professionals propose. Furthermore, we believe that interventions that increase this awareness will pave the way to compromises by opening up previously covert issues. This should help prevent negative consequences from power use and help achieve solutions that are acceptable to both parties.
Recognizing this, we propose in Figure 2 a framework that defines the different conditions of awareness that could be present in any instance of power use. We label the condition in which both users and professionals are aware of power exercise mutual negotiafion, because they may be able to negotiate an outcome they would both perceive as legitimate. However, in the situation of mutual ignorance,
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Communications of the ACM which we label unintended influence, the prospects for successful negotiation or other corrective interventions may be slim. The most problematic situations from a change agent's point of view are th.ose in which awareness is one-sided. When users are aware of a power exercise that IS professionals deny, the latter often speak of user resistance. Sirnilarly, if IS professionals overtly intend to influence users without their knowledge, we have an instance of professional manipulation of users.
Awareness of power exercise does not map perfectly with types of power exercise, but it is clearly easier for both users and IS professionals to become aware of technical power exercise than the other three types. We do not have space here to explore the imperfect correlations between the ty:pes of power use and awareness of power exercise. Nor can we explore fully the implications of our framework of awareness for those who wish to intervene to improve the outcomes of systems development. It is clear, however, that there are many promising avenues of future research on power exercise.
TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS AND POWER EXERCISE
The studies of IS departmental and professional power discussed in the preceding sections of this article were largely conducted in organizations that had implemented a traditional computing "package" [x] of centralized mainframes or minicomputers, custom software developed in-house, cumbersome software development methodologies that "required" the services of professional developers, and usage difficulties that led many users to seek the assistance of information intermediaries. The computing package of today and tomorrow has very different characteristics: standard software packages, advanced system development tools, end-user programming, and "desktop" computing. Many observers believe that these new hardware and software developments will profoundly change the relations between IS professionals and users [12, 331. The unit price of much distributed hardware is presently The situation with software appears to be similar. Even the largest corporations with well-developed internal IS departments routinely purchase software packages for such activities as financial accounting, wage administration, and transaction processing from external vendors, Fourth-generation languages and integrated applications such as Focus, Mapper, Mantis, and Framework simplify software development and reduce the need for professional programmers [33] . Easy-to-use office systems based on the "desktop" metaphor have encouraged many users to interact with information technology without intermediaries. And hybrid structural arrangements, like information centers, attempt to increase user selfsufficiency.
These trends in software development and use appear to reduce users' dependence on IS professionals for expert services in programming and data retrieval. They decrease the number of necessary technological choices and increase the role of users in making the remaining choices. Consequently, by reducing the opportunities for professionals to exercise power over users, these trends would appear over time to lead to greater user participation in, and control over, the outcomes of system development processes. This in turn should increase the propensity of users to exercise power over professionals.
However, we are not so sanguine about the consequences of hardware and software developments for the exercise of power by IS professionals over users, for two reasons. First, these developments can simply change the degree or type of power exercise without necessarily changing the fact of it. In the 197Os, for example, a primary concern of IS functional management was to control the acquisition and operation of data-processing hardware and software development. Today, as is apparent in the slogan "managing the information resource," the attention of IS management has shifted to control over access to data and access to technologies for text, graphics, voice, and video. Although users, not IS professionals, may dominate in decisions about acquiring small-scale data-processing technology, IS professionals may retain their ability to exercise power through their control over a different resource: the important ancillary services of maintenance, training, and ongoing support. These examples do not necessarily represent decreases in power exercise, but rather shifts in type from technical to structural, (In a similar vein, the operations of information centers may displace systems analysis methodologies as an arena in which IS professionals exercise power over users.)
Second, these technological developments can make it more difficult for users to become aware that power is being exercised, thus diminishing users' ability to prevent it or to mitigate its consequences. Even if such developments did permanently reduce the use of the technical, structural, and conceptual types of power exercise (which seems unlikely to us), they do not reduce the symbolic exercise of power. Standard packages or applications configured by users from generators and desktop primitives embody ideals and values that influence user behavior no less than applications developed in-house.
In the case of packages, the major difference, from the user's point of view, is that the power over their behavior is exercised less by IS professionals inside the firm and more by external vendors. The consequences of this shift in power exercise may be considerable: External IS professionals are probably less concerned with users' welfare than IS professionals inside the users' organization.
Furthermore, this symbolic power exercise may have greater effects on user behavior by the very fact that users are so often unaware of it. The myth of "the market" may cloud users' sensitivity to the bias and force of vendors' design choices. The technological package of "end-user computing" may delude users into believing that the only influences on their behavior are those they choose themselves. To paraphrase Weizenbaum (and to overstate the case), information technology has promised us power, but as so often happens when people are seduced by promises of power, the price actually paid is servitude and impotence. [46, p. 2591 
CONCLUSION
Power relations between users and IS professionals are an important topic of research in the field of IS for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, the power of IS professionals is related to their ability to implement technological change. In practice, the power of users may be essential to meaningful participation in systems development.
Optimally, the frameworks of the types and awareness of power exercise will lead to further research on IS power. More importantly, they can provide a foundation for the development of intervention strategies designed to increase users' and IS professionals' recognition of power exercise and hence improve the chances for outcomes acceptable to both parties.
